Abstract. The main objective of this work is to develop a logical framework called IAL (Intentional Agency Logic) in which we can reason about mental states of agents, action occurrences, agentive and group powers. IAL will be exploited for a formal analysis of different forms of power such as an agent's power of achieving a certain result, an agent's power to do a certain action and an agent i's power over another agent j.
Introduction
Power is one of the most important concepts in social theory and multi-agent systems. In this work we aim at devising a general logical framework in which different forms of power can be specified and their intrinsic and relational properties investigated. A formal model of agentive power should clarify many subtle aspects of this individual and social phenomenon. It should characterize the most basic form of agentive power called power to. The power to of an agent i is relative to actions that i is capable to correctly perform at will (i.e. when having the intention to perform them). For example, for an agent to have the power to raise his arm, it has to be case that he will successfully raise his arm if intends to do this. This form of power has to be distinguished from an agent's power of achieving something. When looking at an agent's power of achieving a certain result, we discover that this is based on the interrelation between objective level and subjective level. In fact, i's power of achieving a certain result ϕ seems to involve not only i's objective opportunity of achieving ϕ but also i's awareness over such an opportunity. For example, for a thief to have the power of opening a safe, he must know the safe's combination. In the end, there are intrinsically social forms of power of which are commonly called powers over. These correspond to agentive powers to influence other agents to do or to refrain from doing certain actions. An agent i's power over another agent j consists in i's capacity to shape j's preferences in such a way that j will intend or will not intend to do a certain action. For example, for a politician to have the power over the electorate with regard to the action of voting him, he must have the power of inducing the electorate to vote him. It is evident from these few observations that a comprehensive formal model and ontology of power should allow to: -specify the relationship between an agent's intention and the agent's action performance in order to assess whether the agent has the power to do a certain action at will or not; -reason about beliefs of agents in order to study the discretional aspect of their powers of ; -clarify the true nature of an agent i's power over another agent j as i's capacity to affect j's intentions in such a way that j will do or will refrain from doing a certain action.
In the literature of applied logic both in philosophy and computer science, several authors have developed very sophisticated logics of social interaction [4, 14, 2, 19] . For instance, Alternating-time temporal logic (ATL) [2] is a logic in which one can express what coalitions can achieve by cooperating. ATL has coalition modalities G where G is an arbitrary group of agents G. The ATL formula G Xϕ means that coalition G has a collective strategy to ensure that, no matter what the other agents do, ϕ will be true in the next state. In STIT logic [4, 14] modal operators of the form [i cstit :], called Chellas STIT operators, and a modal operator of historical necessity of the form 2, whose dual is 3, are given. In STIT formulas [i cstit : ϕ] and 3 [i cstit : ϕ] respectively mean that i sees to it that ϕ and i can see to it that ϕ. There are extensions of such logics of social interaction in which knowledge modalities for agents and coalitions of agents are introduced [24, 7] . Moreover, there are extensions in which actions are promoted to first-class citizens in the formal language [22] and the properties of interaction between action and knowledge of agents can be expressed [1] . In our view all these approaches are still insufficient to formalize many relevant forms and properties of agentive and group power. What is still missing in the logical literature is an integration of the expressiveness of such logics of social interaction with the expressivenesses of a logic of mental attitudes (so-called BDI logic 4 ) and dynamic logic [13] in which actions of agents are explicit. 5 In this work we will try to fill this gap by developing a logic which allows to reason about mental states of agents, action occurrences, agentive and group powers and to capture some interesting properties of power to, power of and power over.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we will present the syntax and the semantics of a logic of powers and mental states called IAL (Intentional Agency Logic). In section 3 the axiomatization of IAL will be given and some of its properties will be studied. In the second part of the paper (section 5) we will exploit IAL to formalize and study the properties of different forms of agentive power.
A logic of powers and mental states: syntax and semantics
The logic IAL (Intentional Agency Logic) combines the expressiveness of a logic of actions and mental states with the expressiveness of a logic of social interaction. On the top of a logic which allows to specify what agents and groups of agents can bring about and to talk about occurrences of actions of single agents, we introduce modal operators for beliefs and goals of agents. We here consider intentional actions only. The syntactic primitives of the logic are the following:
-a nonempty finite set of agents AGT = {1, 2, ..., n}; -a nonempty finite set of atomic actions ACT = {a, b, ...}; -a set of atomic formulas Π = {p, q, ...}.
Given an arbitrary agent i ∈ AGT we denote with Act(i) the set of all possible couples i : a, that is, Act(i) = {i : a|a ∈ ACT }. Besides, we denote with ∆ the set of all possible combinations of actions by the agents in AGT , that is, ∆ = i∈AGT Act(i). Elements in ∆ are tuples denoted by δ, δ , δ ,... For notational convenience, given a certain δ ∈ ∆, we denote with δ i the element in δ corresponding to agent i. For example, if AGT = {1, 2, 3}, and δ = (1 : a, 2 : b, 3 : c), then δ 1 = 1 : a. Moreover, we denote with δ C := (δ i ) i∈C the tuple which consists of all δ i for i ∈ C. For example, if AGT = {1, 2, 3}, C = {1, 2} and δ = (1 : a, 2 : b, 3 : c), then δ C = (1 : a, 2 : b). The language L IAL is given by the following BNF:
where p ∈ Π, a ∈ ACT , i ∈ AGT and C ⊆ AGT . Bel i ϕ is read "agent i believes that ϕ" whereas Goal i ϕ is read "agent i has the chosen goal that ϕ" or simply "agent i has decided to pursue ϕ". For the sake of simplicity, we will often use the expression "agent i wants that ϕ" as a reading of Goal i ϕ. An agent's chosen goals are supposed to be consistent and compatible with his beliefs. The standard reading of [i : a] ϕ is "ϕ holds after every occurrence of action a done by agent i". Hence [i : a] ⊥ expresses "agent i does not do action a". If C is a coalition of two or more agents Does C ϕ is read "agents in coalition C bring it about that ϕ by doing something together" or simply "coalition C brings it about that ϕ". For the individual case, Does i ϕ is read "agent i brings it about that ϕ by doing some action" or simply "agent i brings it about that ϕ". The operator 2 is used to quantify over choices of agents. Thus, 2ϕ has to be read "ϕ is true in each world corresponding to a choice for every agent" or simply "ϕ is necessarily true". Several abbreviations are used in our logic. The classical Boolean connectives ∧, →, ↔, (tautology) and ⊥ (contradiction) are defined from ∨ and ¬ in the usual manner. Moreover, i : a ϕ abbreviates ¬ [i : a] ¬ϕ, 3ϕ abbreviates ¬2¬ϕ. As we will show in section 3, under some assumptions of our logic the more natural readings of i : a ϕ is "agent i does a and ϕ is true after a's occurrence". In fact, we suppose that an action performed by an agent at a certain moment is responsible for producing all outcomes that the agent brings about at that moment and produces only those outcomes. 6 Finally, 3ϕ is read "there exists a world corresponding to a choice for every agent in which ϕ is true" or simply "ϕ can/may be true". The operators 3 and Does C (viz. Does i ) can be exploited for expressing what a coalition C (viz. a single agent i) can bring about. 3Does C ϕ has to be read "there exists a world corresponding to a choice for every agent in which coalition C brings it about that ϕ" or simply " coalition C can bring it about that ϕ".
Model definition
IAL models are tuples M = (W, R, R 2 , S, B, G, π) where:
-W is a set of possible worlds or states; -R 2 is an equivalence relation on W ; -R is a collection of binary relations R i:a on W one for every couple i : a where i ∈ AGT and a ∈ ACT ; -S is a collection of serial relations S C on W one for every coalition C ⊆ AGT ; -B and G are collections of binary relations B i and G i on W one for every agent i ∈ AGT . We suppose that every B i is transitive, euclidean and serial, whilst every
W is a valuation function.
We suppose that all IAL models satisfy the following additional semantic conditions. For any a ∈ ACT , i ∈ AGT , w ∈ W :
For any w ∈ W and B, C ⊆ AGT :
For any w ∈ W , C ⊆ AGT and δ ∈ ∆:
For any w ∈ W , B, C ⊆ AGT such that B ∩ C = ∅ and δ, δ ∈ ∆:
(S.13) a∈ACT R i:a (w) = ∅ According to Property S.1, the set of outcomes that the empty coalition brings about is a subset of the set of all outcomes that the biggest coalition AGT can bring about. According to S.2, the set of outcomes that the empty coalition can bring about is independent from what the agents in AGT do. According to property S.3, if action a done by i produces an outcome then all outcomes brought about by i are outcomes that i bring about by doing a and all outcomes that i brings about by doing a are outcomes that i brings about. An interesting consequence of property S.3 is that, if an agent i does n actions in parallel (for any n ≥ 1) then the n actions are responsible for producing the outcomes that i brings about and only produce those outcomes. More generally, for every world w the relation S i (w) (which corresponds to an abstract action performed by agent i) is assigned a subset of the finite set of action names ACT which represents all concrete actions that i does in parallel at world w. Property S.4 says that the biggest coalition AGT brings about exactly one outcome. Properties S.5 and S.6 characterize the relationship between actions and goals. S.5 says that if action a is not performed by i then for every i's goal-accessible world, a is not executed by i. S.6 says that if action a is performed by i then for every i's goal-accessible world, a is performed by i. S.7 is a condition of weak realism, according to which, the set of i's belief-accessible worlds and the set of i's goal-accessible worlds are never disjoint. Property S.8 says that worlds that are compatible with i's goals are compatible with i's goals from those worlds which are compatible with i's beliefs. S.9 is a semantic condition of confluence which describes the relationship between R 2 and every B i . According to Property S.10, the set of outcomes brought about by the union of coalitions B and C is a subset of the set of outcomes brought about by coalition B. Since R 2 is an equivalence relation, Property S.11 can be rewritten as follows. For any w ∈ W , C ⊆ AGT and δ ∈ ∆:
This means that, the set of outcomes that agents in C can bring about by doing a combination of actions δ C := (δ i ) i∈C is independent from what the other agents in AGT /C do. Property S.12 says that, given two disjoint coalitions B and C, if agents in C can do together a combination of actions δ C := (δ i ) i∈C and agents in B can do together a combination of actions δ B := (δ i ) i∈B , then agents in B ∪ C can do together the combination of actions (δ C , δ B ). Property S.13 says that for any world w and agent i there is at least one action done by i at w (i.e. agents are never passive).
Truth conditions
Given a model M , a world w and a formula ϕ, we write M, w |= ϕ to mean that ϕ is true at world w in M , under the basic semantics. The rules defining the truth conditions of formulas of our logic are inductively defined as follows.
We write |= IAL φ if formula φ is valid in all IAL models, i.e. M, w |= φ for every IAL model M and world w in M. Finally, we say that a formula φ is satisfiable if there exists a IAL model M and world w in M such that M, w |= φ.
Axiomatization
The series of axiom schemes of IAL are given in Fig. 1 . S5 2 corresponds to the (ProTau) All tautologies of propositional calculus (S52) All S5-theorems for 2 (KDStit)
All KD-theorems for every DoesC (KD45 Bel ) All KD45-theorems for every Beli (KD Goal )
All KD-theorems for every Goali (KAct) All K-theorems for every fact that R 2 is an equivalence relation; KD Stit corresponds to the seriality of every S C ; KD45 Bel to the seriality, euclideanity and transitivity of every B i ; KD Goal to the seriality of every G i . Moreover the following correspondence relations exist between the previous axioms and the semantic properties given in the previous section: Axiom Alt Stit corresponds to property S.4, Incl Stit to S.1, 4 Does ∅ ,2 to S.2, SP to S.11, Indep to S.12, Active to S.13, Mon to S.10, StitAct to S.3, IntAct1 to S.5, IntAct2 to S.6, D Bel,Goal to S.7, PosIntr and NegIntr to S.8 and Confl Bel,2 to S.9.
Axioms K Act , S5 2 , KD45 Bel , KD Goal correspond to standard axiomatizations for the operators [i : a] and 2, the belief and goal operators. Axiom D Bel,Goal is a weak realism axiom which relates an agent's beliefs with his goals, whereas PosIntr and NegIntr are principles of positive and negative introspection for goals [11] . According to Axiom Alt Stit the biggest coalition AGT always produces deterministic effects, whilst according to Axioms Incl Stit and 4 Does ∅ ,2 , if the biggest coalition AGT necessarily brings it about that ϕ then the empty coalition brings it about that ϕ and, if the empty coalition brings it about that ϕ then it necessarily brings it about that ϕ. We suppose that modal operators Does C "see one step forward". Thus we simply adopt a KD logic for every Does C (Axiom KD Stit ). Axiom Mon corresponds to a monotonicity property: if coalition B ensures ϕ then ϕ is ensured by all coalitions of which B is a subset. 8 According to Axiom SP, given a combination δ of actions of agents in AGT if every agent i in C does his part by executing the corresponding δ i in δ and the coalition C brings it about that ϕ then, necessarily, if every agent i in C does his part by executing the corresponding δ i in δ, coalition C brings it about that ϕ. Axiom SP characterizes a strong notion of power. Indeed, given Axiom SP, saying "coalition C can ensure ϕ by doing a certain combination of actions" is equivalent to say that "if coalition C does a certain combination of actions then it will ensure ϕ, no matter what the other agents in AGT do". 9 Axiom Indep says that if B and C are two disjoint coalitions, agents in C can do together a certain combination of actions δ C and agents in B can do together a certain combination of actions δ B then agents in B ∪ C can do together a combination of actions (δ C , δ B ). This axiom is the "actional" counterpart of the axiom of independence of agents (called AIA k ) given in [4] . 10 Axiom Active says that an agent always performs at least one action. According to Axiom IntAct1, an agent does action a only if he intends to do a. Thus, in our formal model the actions performed by an agent are intentional actions. According to Axiom IntAct2, at each moment an agent either decides (intends) to do an action or decides (intends) not to do it. Axiom Confl Bel,2 says that if there exists a world corresponding to a choice for every agent in which i believes that ϕ is true then i believes that there exists a world corresponding to a choice for every agent in which ϕ is true. Imagine there are two agents called Bill and Bob, and there exists a world corresponding to a choice of Bill and a choice of Bob in which Bob believes that he will meet Bill (i.e. 3Bel Bob Does {Bob,Bill} BobM eetsBill). This is the world where both Bill and Bob decide to go to the same place Y and Bob believes that Bill has decided to go to Y . It seems reasonable to say that at the actual world -suppose this is the world where Bob decides to go to Y and Bill decides not to go-, Bob believes that there exists a world corresponding to Bill's choice and Bob's choice to go to Y in which Bill and Bob will meet (i.e. Bel Bob 3Does {Bob,Bill} BobM eetsBill). In section 5.1 we will clarify why, on the other hand, property Bel i 3ϕ → 3Bel i ϕ cannot be accepted. Axiom StitAct is an interaction axiom between action occurrences and agentive causation. According to this axiom, an action performed by an agent at a certain moment is responsible for producing all outcomes that the agent brings about at that moment and produces only those outcomes. As noted in section 2, due to the semantic property S.3 corresponding to StitAct (i.e. if R i:a (w) = ∅ then S i (w) = R i:a (w)), formula i : a has to be read "agent i does a", and i : a ∧ [i : a] ϕ has to be read "agent i brings it about that ϕ by doing a". This means that, in IAL, i : a has not the standard dynamic logic reading "it is possible that i does a". In fact, according to property S.3, if action a done by i produces an outcome then all outcomes brought 8 Note that Mon is equivalent to DoesBϕ ∧ DoesC ψ → DoesB∪C (ϕ ∧ ψ). 9 At the single-agent level, this axiom corresponds to Weber's concept of power [27] as the capacity of an individual to resist to all interferences of other individuals, that is, "...the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance..." (p. 152). 10 Xu's Axiom AIA k is a family of axiom schemes for independence of agents parameterized by the integer k of the form:
about by i are outcomes that i bring about by doing a and all outcomes that i brings about by doing a are outcomes that i brings about. It follows that the more natural readings of formulas 3 i : a and 3( i : a ∧ [i : a] ϕ) are respectively "agent i can do a" and "agent i can bring it about that ϕ by doing a". Furthermore, we have to note that, due to the fact that Does AGT is deterministic, it is reasonable to conceive state w such that w = S AGT (w) as the unique temporal successor of w and to read Does AGT ϕ "ϕ will be true in the next state". Thus, Does AGT can be interpreted as a standard operator X (next) of temporal logic.
We call IAL the logic axiomatized by the twenty principles given in Fig. 1 and we write IAL φ if formula φ is a theorem of IAL. Since the set of agents AGT and the set of atomic actions ACT is supposed to be finite, we can prove that IAL is sound and complete with respect to the class of IAL models.
Theorem 1. IAL is determined by the class of models of IAL.
Proof. It is a routine to prove soundness, whereas completeness is obtained by Sahlqvist's completeness theorem [5] .
Some properties of IAL
The following theorems highlight some interesting properties of IAL.
Theorem 2. For any
Proof. Here we only prove Theorem 2.1 and Theorem 2.8. Let us start with Theorem 2.1. 3Does B ϕ and 3Does C ψ together imply ∃δ, δ ∈ ∆ such that 3( i∈B δ i ∧ Does B ϕ) and 3( j∈C δ j ∧ Does C ψ) (by Axiom Active). From this, it follows that 3(( i∈B,j∈C δ i ∧ δ j ) ∧ Does B ϕ ∧ Does C ψ) (by Axiom Indep, Axiom SP and the fact that B and C are disjoint). We can conclude that 3Does B∪C (ϕ ∧ ψ) (by Axiom Mon). In order to prove Theorem 2.8 it is sufficient to note that
(by Axiom D Bel,Goal ) which in turn implies Goal i i : a (by Axiom IntAct2).
Theorem 2.1 says that two disjoint coalitions can combine their efforts to ensure a conjunction of outcomes. This corresponds to the superadditivity axiom of Coalition Logic [19] 
that ϕ by doing a then he can bring it about that ϕ. Theorem 2.5, which is a direct consequence of Theorem 2.1, says that two disjoint coalitions can never bring about conflicting effects. Theorems 2.6 and 2.7 are about the relation between intentions, beliefs and action occurrences: if an agent does action a then he believes that he intends to do a; if an agent does not intend to do action a now then he believes that he will not perform a. Theorem 2.8 expresses a sort of generative principle for intentions according to which, if i wants ϕ to be true and believes that ϕ will be true only if he does a then i comes to intend to do a. It has to be noted that Does i ϕ → Bel i Does i ϕ and ¬Does i ϕ → Bel i ¬Does i ϕ are not valid here, that is, an agent is not necessarily aware of what he will bring about.
Related works
Main differences between STIT and IAL Some substantial differences exist between IAL and STIT logic [4, 14] . Formulas in STIT logic can be built by means of the boolean connectives together with the modal operator 2 of historic necessity, whose dual is 3, and the so-called Chellas STIT operator [i cstit : ]. The modal construction 2ϕ is read "ϕ is true in all possible histories", whereas [i cstit : ϕ] is read "agent i sees to it that ϕ". Thus, 3 [i cstit : ϕ] and 2 [i cstit : ϕ] have to be read "agent i can see to it that ϕ" and "agent i necessarily sees to it that ϕ". Space restrictions prevent presenting STIT semantics, the interpretation of operators 2 and [i cstit : ] and their semantic relationships. Let us only remark that in STIT theory formulas of type [i cstit : ϕ] are interpreted according to equivalence relations. Thus, [i cstit : ϕ] → ϕ is valid in STIT. This means that in STIT theory actions are supposed to be instantaneous. In IAL we suppose that an agent (viz. a coalition of agents) brings about something as an effect of his actions (viz. joint actions) and that actions (viz. joint actions) are not instantaneous. For these reasons, for every C ⊆ AGT S C is simply a serial relation and for every C ⊆ AGT Does C ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ is satisfiable. 11 Moreover, it has to be noted that under STIT semantics the following formulas are valid:
12 This means that in STIT logic an agent can never really induce another agent to ensure some state of affairs ϕ. In fact, in STIT an agent always acts independently from what other agents do and cannot be induced to bring about something that he would not bring about without being in-duced. 13 This is a serious limitation of this logic since it prevents expressing crucial aspects of sociality such as indirect power (see section 5.4). The nice aspect of IAL is that it does not incur these limitations. For instance, due to the temporal properties of the modal operators Does i , in IAL the formulas Does i Does j ϕ ∧ ¬2Does j ϕ and Does i Does j ϕ ∧ ¬Does i 2Does j ϕ are satisfiable. Thus, IAL allows to express the fact that an agent j is induced by i to bring about ϕ while ϕ is something that j would not bring about without being induced by i. [19] is one of the most well-known logics for multiagent systems. CL has been introduced to reason about what single agents and groups of agents are able to achieve. CL has coalition modalities of the form [C] where C is an arbitrary coalition of agents C ⊆ AGT (where AGT is the set of all agents). The CL formula [C] ϕ is read "the coalition C can bring about (can enforce an outcome state satisfying) ϕ". In an extended version of this paper [16] it is proved that IAL subsumes Coalition Logic. More precisely the following translation tr(.) from formulas of CL to formulas of IAL is given:
Relationship between Coalition Logic and IAL Pauly's Coalition Logic (CL)
and the following three theorems are proved:
-If ϕ is a theorem of CL then tr(ϕ) is a theorem of IAL.
-If ϕ is CL-satisfiable then tr(ϕ) is satisfiable in IAL.
-ϕ is CL-satisfiable if and only if tr(ϕ) is satisfiable in IAL.
A general observation Modal operators of logics of agency typically have three components: historic necessity, agent's choice, and time. In Pauly's Coalition Logic and in ATL these three components are fused and make up a single non-normal modal operator. We have seen that in STIT logic, these three ingredients are separated, and each has its own modal operator. In IAL we explore the middle ground: we fuse the choice and the temporal next operator.
Varieties of Power

Power of
The aim of this section is to provide a formal characterization of the concept of power of by exploiting the expressiveness of IAL. We will start with a general definition of power of and we will progressively refine it. As argued in [8, 3] , for an agent i to have the power of achieving ϕ: i must have the objective opportunity to achieve ϕ and, he must be aware of this. 14 In fact, without i's discretion over his objective opportunity, i would not be capable of exploiting it in order to ensure ϕ. A first rough pre-formal definition of i's power of achieving ϕ is given by the two conditions:
1. i can bring it about that ϕ (objective opportunity); 2. i believes that he can bring it about that ϕ (discretion over the opportunity).
In IAL the former condition is expressed by the formula 3Does i ϕ, while the latter condition is expressed by the formula Bel i 3Does i ϕ. Here we denote with K i ϕ i's correct belief that ϕ holds.
Definition 2. For any
Then, i's power of achieving ϕ can be expressed by the formula K i 3Does i ϕ. If we look carefully at the semantics of K i 3Does i ϕ, we can easily discover that it is insufficient to express a notion of genuine power. An evident problem with such a formal definition is the absence of a condition which guarantees that ϕ is not something which would happen in any case (independently from i's intervention). A more precise definition of objective opportunity would require a negative condition of the form ¬2Xϕ. In fact, it is counterintuitive to say that i has the opportunity of achieving ϕ when 2Xϕ holds, that is, when ϕ is going to be true whatever i does. For example, the fact "2+2=4" is something which is going to be true whatever i does (i.e. 2X "2+2=4"). For this reason, it is quite odd to say that i has the opportunity of ensuring that "2+2=4". This observation leads to the following refined formal characterization of objective opportunity: 3Does i ∧ ¬2Xϕ. From this, one might try to formalize the concept i's power of achieving ϕ by the formula K i (3Does i ϕ ∧ ¬2Xϕ). But again this is not sufficient to formalize a genuine concept of power. In fact, K i (3Does i ϕ ∧ ¬2Xϕ) simply says "i correctly believes that there exists some action whose execution can ensure ϕ and that ϕ is not something that is going to be true whatever i does". It does not say "there exists some action such that i may correctly believe that he will ensure ϕ by doing that action". 15 To see why K i (3Does i ϕ ∧ ¬2Xϕ) is insufficient to capture the concept of power consider the scenario in Fig. 2 . Agent i is at w 1 and is in front of two doors A and B. Behind door A there is a treasure, behind door B there is nothing. Besides, i believes that behind one of the two doors there is a treasure whereas behind the other there is nothing, but he is not sure whether the treasure is behind door A or B. The agent can either open door A or open door B. In world w 1 and in each world which is compatible with i's beliefs at w 1 (worlds w 7 and w 9 ) it is the case that he can get the treasure and that getting the treasure is not something that is going to necessarily happen. From this, we conclude that at w 1 i correctly believes that he can get the treasure and that getting the treasure is not something that is going to necessarily happen: K i (3Does i t∧¬2Xt) holds at w 1 . Unfortunately, there is no action that i may correctly believe that it will ensure ϕ. So, it is reasonable to say that in the example i does not have the power of getting the treasure. At w 1 i cannot correctly believe that he will get the treasure by opening door A nor correctly believe that he will get the treasure by opening door B:
More generally, at w 1 i cannot correctly believe that he will get the treasure: ¬3K i Does i t holds at at w 1 . From the previous example, we have to conclude that an agent i does not have the 
1
* i may correctly believe that he will ensure ϕ by doing a and i correctly believes that ϕ is not something that is going to be true whatever he does.
More generally, an agent i does not have the power of achieving ϕ unless: 2 * i may correctly believe that he will ensure ϕ and i correctly believes that ϕ is not something that is going to be true whatever he does. 1 * and 2 * correspond to a notion of power of which can be formalized in IAL.
Definition 3. For any
Definitions 3.A, 3.B and 3.C respectively characterize i's opportunity of achieving ϕ by doing action a (i.e. i can ensure ϕ by doing a and ϕ is not something that is going to be true whatever i does), i's power of achieving ϕ by doing action a (definition 1 * ) and i's power of achieving ϕ (definition 2 * ). 16 It is straightforward to prove that P ower(i, a, ϕ) implies P ower(i, ϕ). Moreover, by Axiom Confl Bel,2 , we can show that both P ower(i, a, ϕ) and P ower(i, ϕ) imply K i (3Does i ϕ ∧ ¬2Xϕ) 17 which, as discussed above, characterizes a situation of uncertainty in which i cannot determine what action must be taken to ensure ϕ. The following theorems highlight some properties of the previous notions of power.
Theorem 3.
For any i ∈ AGT and a ∈ ACT
Proof. We only prove → direction of Theorem 3.1. The other direction is trivially satisfied by definition of K i ϕ. By definition of P ower(i, a, ϕ) and K i ϕ , we have that
. From this and the definition of P ower(i, a, ϕ) we can infer K i P ower(i, a, ϕ).
According to Theorem 3.1, an agent has the power of achieving ϕ by doing a if and only if he correctly believes this. The same principle holds for the general concepts of power without action argument. In fact, P ower(i, ϕ) ↔ K i P ower(i, ϕ) is a theorem of IAL as well. According to Theorem 3.2 if an agent has the power of achieving ϕ by doing a then he correctly believes that if he does action a then he will ensure ϕ, no matter what the other agents will do.
Power to
As stressed in the introduction of the paper, the most basic form of agentive power is the so-called power to. The power to of an agent i concerns an action that i can do at will. One might try to formalize such a concept by constructions of the form 3 i : a (i.e. i can do action a). Nevertheless, these constructions are insufficient to characterize a true notion of power to. Suppose that i can do the action of raising an arm, i.e. 3 i : raiseArm , and it is possible that i intends to raise his arm and he does not succeed in doing this since j blocks i's movement, i.e. 3(Goal i i : raiseArm ∧ j : block ∧ [i : raiseArm] ⊥). In this scenario, we would not say that i has the power to raise the arm. In fact, the possibility that i will raise an arm in a successful way heavily depends on what j will decide do. This example leads us to conclude that for an agent i to have the power to do action a it has to be case that:
1. i can do a; 2. if i intends to do a now then i will do a in a successful way, no matter what the other agents do.
Definition 4. For any
i ∈ AGT , a ∈ ACT P owerT o(i, a) = def 2(Goal i i : a → i : a ) ∧ 3 i : a
Exercise of power
There are two different and equally important views of power. On the one hand, power can be conceived as a capacity, as a potential power. On the other hand, power can be conceived as the exercise of a capacity, as the exercise of power. The notion of power defined in section 5.1 is a power in the former sense. Now, we want to look at power in the latter sense. To this end, we provide a quite general definition of exercise of power of. We suppose that an agent i exercises his power of achieving ϕ by doing a if and only if i has the power of achieving ϕ by doing action a and he does a. Thus, in our account i's exercise of power of corresponds to the fact i has a certain power plus the fact that i does the action on which his power is based. 
by Theorem 2.6) which in turn implies i : a ∧ P ower(i, a, ϕ) ∧ Bel i i : a (by Axiom K for Bel i and Axiom T for 2). From this, by Theorem 3.2 and the definition of K i , we can infer
a] ϕ we can conclude that K i Does i ϕ (by Axiom StitAct and Axiom T for 2).
According to Theorems 4.1 and 4.2, if i exercises his power of achieving ϕ then he brings it about that ϕ and if i exercises his power of achieving ϕ by a and believes that he has the power to do a then he correctly believes that he brings it about that ϕ.
Power over
An interesting form of power on which many authors have focused is the intrinsically social power called power over. There is no consensus on the meaning of the expression "an agent has power over another agent with respect a given issue, fact, etc...". Several alternative definitions have been proposed. A major point of disagreement is whether i's power over j should be based on j's dependence on i for the achievement of his goals (dependence-based power over) or whether it should be based on i's ability, to affect the behavior of j by inducing j to intend to do a certain action or to refrain from doing a certain action (power of influencing). 18 In this section we only focus on that form of power over called power of influencing. That is, we suppose that an agent i has a power over agent j when i is in a position to induce j to intend to do certain action or in a position to induce j to want to refrain from doing a certain action. In the former case i has the power of shaping j's preferences in such a way that j will intend to do a certain action, in the latter case i has the power of shaping j's preferences in such a way that j will intend not to do a certain action. Thus, in the present analysis i's power over is conceived as the particular type of i's power of relative to the intentions of other agents in the social world. More precisely, we say that i has the positive (viz. negative) power over j with respect to action a if and only if i has the power of ensuring that j will intend to do (viz. will intend not to do) action a. Formally: Definition 6. For any i, j ∈ AGT , a ∈ ACT A. P osP owerOver(i, j, a) = def P ower(i, Goal j j : a ) B. N egP owerOver(i, j, a) = def P ower(i, Goal j [j : a] ⊥) As in [20] , we distinguish power over from indirect power. In our view, agent i has the indirect power of achieving ϕ via agent j if and only if i has the power of ensuring that j will bring it about that ϕ. Formally: IndP ower(i, j, ϕ) = def P ower(i, Does j ϕ).
Effective power
In section 5.1 we have only focused on what Lukes [18] calls operative sense of power, that is, the power sufficient to produce a certain result. A more radical form of power is the so-called power in an effective sense, that is, the power necessary and sufficient to produce a certain result. For example, the judge in a court has the effective power of imprisoning the defendant by sentencing him to imprisonment given that he can imprison the defendant by sentencing him to imprisonment (sufficiency) and as long as he does not sentence the defendant, the defendant will not be imprisoned (necessity).
In order to formalize the notion of effective power, the definition of power given in section 5.1 has to be refined in an appropriate way. First, we have to add the conjunct 2([i : a] ⊥ → ¬Xϕ) to definition 3.A (section 5.1) of opportunity. This new conjunct expresses the fact that the occurrence of action a performed by i is necessary to ensure that ϕ will be true next. This operation leads us to a formal definition of i's effective opportunity of achieving ϕ by doing action a, that is, i's capacity of achieving ϕ by a which resists to all interferences of other agents and which must be necessarily exercised by i to ensure ϕ (definition 7.A). From the concept of effective opportunity, it is straightforward to come up with a formal definition of effective power. We suppose that i has the effective power of achieving ϕ by doing action a if and only if i has the power of achieving ϕ by doing action a and correctly believes that he must do a in order to ensure that ϕ will be true next (definition 7.B). Again this can be generalized to a notion of i's effective power of achieving ϕ (definition 7.C).
Definition 7. For any
Theorem 5 captures an interesting relationship between effective power, exercise of power and power to. According to Theorem 5, if i has the effective power of achieving ϕ by a, i wants ϕ to be true next and has the power to do a then i exercises his power of achieving ϕ by doing a. Moreover, from Theorems 5, 4.1 and 4.2, and the fact that Does i ϕ implies Xϕ, we can derive the following interesting theorem: Ef f P ower(i, a, ϕ) ∧ Goal i Xϕ ∧ K i P owerT o(i, a) → K i Xϕ. Thus, if i has the effective power of achieving ϕ by doing a, wants ϕ to be true and correctly believes that he has the power to do a, then i correctly believes that he will achieve ϕ. The present analysis of effective power can also be extended to those forms of power called power over studied in section 5.4. Here, we conceive i's effective positive (viz. negative) power over j with respect to action a as i's effective power of inducing j to intend to do action a (viz. i' power of inducing j to intend not to do action a). The former concept is expressed by the formula Ef f P ower(i, Goal j j : a ), the latter is expressed by Ef f P ower(i, Goal j [j : a] ⊥). Ef f P ower(i, Goal j j : a ) corresponds to i's power to induce j to intend do a certain action a that i would not otherwise intend to do. This is similar to Dahl's concept of power over [10] .
Conclusion
There are several ways in which the work presented in this paper can be advanced. An interesting direction of application is social trust theory. As in [9] , we accept a definition of social trust with four arguments, that is, we would say that an agent i trusts j with respect to a given task ϕ and action a, when the former wants to solve task ϕ and thinks that the latter has the opportunity to solve the task by doing action a, is willing and has the power to do action a. As the following abbreviation shows, such a conceptual core of trust can be formalized by exploiting the formal constructions studied in this paper: T rust(i, j, a, ϕ) = def Goal i Xϕ∧Bel i (Opp(j, a, ϕ)∧Goal j j : a ∧P owerT o(j, a) ). From T rust(i, j, a, ϕ) , a definition of trust with three arguments can be given: T rust(i, j, ϕ) = def a∈ACT T rust (i, j, a, ϕ) . This is the formal translation of the expression "i trusts j with respect to a given task ϕ". The two definitions correspond to a form of strong trust. In fact, we can prove that in our logic both T rust(i, j, a, ϕ) and T rust(i, j, ϕ) imply Bel i Does j ϕ: if i trusts j with respect to a given task ϕ then i thinks that j is going to solve the task.
Another interesting direction of application is the theory of collective powers [8] . IAL's constructions for groups of agents of the form Does C ϕ can be useful for understanding how powers of coalitions interact with powers and mental attitudes of individuals. We have argued that, for an agent i to have the power of achieving ϕ, i must have both the objective opportunity to achieve ϕ and, being aware of such an opportunity. The same argument applies to collective powers. Indeed, it seems reasonable to suppose that, for a group of agents C to have the power of achieving ϕ, agents in C must be able to perform a joint action that will ensure ϕ and must be collectively aware of this, where being collectively aware of something seems to require some group belief notions such as common belief.
We also think that IAL is a suitable framework for studying games in strategic form and for clarifying the epistemic foundations of some game theoretic notions such as Nash equilibrium. 19 In the future we will investigate such an intriguing issue and try to understand how an agent's preferences are related with his goals.
